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Geopolitics of pipelines and Eastern Europe with especial 
regard to Hungary
Károly Kocsis1–Tibor Tiner2
Abstract
The energy strategy of East Central European countries have joined to EU in 2004 is dif-
ferentiated. It can be stated that majority of these countries have already energy policy 
and strategy to secure their own energy supply. All of them are making fl uent eﬀ orts to 
be independent from considerable part of the Russian oil and gas import in the near or 
farer future. To avoid negative eﬀ ects of the future’s unforeseen gas wars and unfriendly 
actions originated from Russia or Ukraine, the new member states of the European Union 
have worked out more scenarios and projects for the future. Additionally, they have also 
declared targets to increase the rate of renewable energy in their domestic energy produc-
tion. Opposite to it Hungary is still stuck into powerful energy economies that drive to 
international energy-security politics. The county has just switched sides when turned oﬀ  
from US initiations and gave preference to Russian connections. Furthermore there are no 
visible indication of a coherent national energy security strategy. It is not surprising that the 
country is not taken into account when decisions are made, neither to the extent is should. 
It shoud be priority to take pending political decisions and  form a real national strategy.
Key words: energy policy, gas pipelines, East Central Europe 
The global energy sector is under a continuous tension since the end of the 20th 
century, which is a result of the rapid growth of global energy consumption, 
of the skyrocketing of energy prices and the strong competition for the energy 
resources. So it is understandable, that the security of supply of energy, being 
the engine of economic development, is an extremely important issue, fi rst 
of all for the importing countries. This is especially true for the EU-member 
countries, which are only able to cover a minor part of their energy consump-
tion by own production (Table 1). The present-day tense situation results from 
the risks of great imbalances between energy demand and supply. Additional 
problems are the territorial concentration of the major hydrocarbon reserves 
and the political uncertainty in some of these energy producing regions 
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(Fig. 1, 2). The Golf States and Russia possess the 62.9% of the proved oil and 
73.3% of the proved natural gas reserves of the world (Table 2). At the same 
time the majority of the energy import concentrates to Europe and North 
America (e.g. 59% of the crude oil import, 85.5% of the natural gas import in 
Table 1. World Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production and Consumption (2006)
Continents, regions
Crude Oil
Million tons
Natural Gas
Billion cubic metres
Production Consumption Production Consumption
North America
Central & South America
Europe
Former USSR
Middle East
Africa
Asia & Oceania
World Total
EU-27
454.9
533.6
251.9
607.3
1240.2
499.8
394.5
3984.2
119.8
1055.1
375.2
771.0
193.9
329.0
142.1
1186.8
4053.1
731.6
713
194.9
309
832.8
345.4
197.3
375
2967.4
213.3
724.7
185.6
551.8
681.8
324.9
86.9
432.2
2987.9
532.1
Source: www.eia.doe.gov
Table 2. World Proved Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves (January 1, 2009)
Continents, regions, 
countries
Crude Oil Natural Gas
Billion 
barrels Million tons
Trillion cubic 
feet
Billion cubic 
metres
North America
Central & South America
Europe
Former USSR
Middle East
Africa
Asia & Oceania
World Total
EU-27
Norway
Russian Federation
Kazakhstan
Azerbaĳ an
Turkmenistan
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
Algeria
209,910
122,687
13,657
98,886
745,998
117,064
34,006
1,342,207
6,321
6,680
60,000
30,000
7,000
0,600
136,150
115,000
104,000
15,210
266,710
97,800
12,200
28,754.8
16,806.4
1,870.8
13,546.0
102,191.5
16,036.2
4,658.4
183,864.0
865.9
915.1
8219.2
4,109.6
958.9
82.2
18,650.7
15,753.4
14,246.6
2,083.6
36,535.6
13,397.3
1,671.2
308,794
266,541
169,086
1993,800
2591,653
494,078
430,412
6254,364
84,296
81,680
1,680,000
85,000
30,000
94,000
991,600
111,940
63,360
891,945
258,470
214,400
159,000
42,300.5
36,512.5
23,162.5
273,123.3
355,021.0
67,681.9
58,960.5
856,762.2
11,547.4
11,189.0
230,137.0
11,643.8
4,109.6
12,876.7
135,835.6
15,334.2
8,679.5
122,184.2
35,406.8
29,369.9
21,780.8
Source: www.eia.doe.gov
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2005). The largest European oil and gas consumers (and importers) are in the 
west (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Benelux states) surrounded from 
afar by their largest suppliers (Russia, Norway, Algeria, Lybia, Golf states) 
(Fig. 3, 4). The territorial imbalance between the energy exporters and import-
ers upgraded the role of the transit countries, who during the last years, the 
time of the infl ating energy prices oft en came into confl icts, price-disputes with 
the producers (e.g. Russia’s disputes with Ukraine in 2006, 2009, with Belarus 
in 2007). These confl icts resulting temporary breakdown in the energy supply 
drew att ention the importance of the security of energy supply, the security of 
the energy markets and the need of the diversifi cation of supply routes. In this 
Eurasian geopolitical context of the energetic issue the East European countries 
play a special role as an important transit area between Russia, Middle East 
and Western Europe.
Fig. 1. Oil reserves in Europe (January 1, 2009, million tons)
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Some geopolitical characteristics of the energy supply in Europe
During the last quarter century the production and consumption of crude 
oil and the production of natural gas nearly stabilized, in parallel with the 
sharp decline of the coal production and consumption. Due to the fact, that the 
natural gas is the cleanest, most nature-friendly energy source (similar to the 
nuclear energy) and its application entails any social problems, its share in the 
European energy balance is continuously increasing. Between 1980 and 2005 
the gas consumption of the EU-27 increased by 88.4% and for the period of 
2005–2030 a growth of 24% (from 537 bcm to 666 bcm) is forecasted. At the same 
time the EU’s gas production will decrease by 30% until 2030 (Esnault, B.  et 
al. 2007). These facts underline the dynamically increasing import dependency 
of the EU-27 (52.3%), which is in the case of coal 39.6%, 82.2% of crude oil and 
Fig. 2. Gas reserves in Europe (January 1, 2009, billion m³)
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57.7% of natural gas (2005) (Table 3). This external dependency of the EU is ex-
pected to reach by 2030 66% (coal), 90% (oil) and 80% (gas) (Geopolitics… 2007). 
The dependency of import of hydrocarbons is especially high in the Visegrád 
Group. Due to their historic (COMECON3) past and geographic location their 
oil and gas import is almost exclusively controlled by the Russian Federation. 
The fi rst international oil and gas pipelines supplying the V4 countries with 
Soviet (mostly Russian) fuels were built during the 1960s (Druzhba-Friendship 
oil pipeline 1964, Brotherhood gas pipeline 1967) (Fig. 5).
During the Socialist-Soviet period the oil and gas supply was stable and 
based on long term agreements, also with Western Europe (since 1968!) in spite 
of political disagreements. Following the collapse of the communist alliance sys-
³ COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) was an economic organization of 
the socialist states led (and controlled) by the USSR, between 1949 and 1991.
Fig. 3. Crude oil production and consumption in Europe (2008)
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tem and of the USSR – in spite of the surviving energy interdependencies – the 
previous stability of international energy supply in the post-Communist coun-
tries gradually came to an end. The deeply changed international situation in 
Fig. 4. Natural gas production and consumption in Europe (2008)
Table 3. Fuel Import Dependency of EU-27 and of the Visegrád Group (2005, 2030 in %)
All fuels Coal Oil Gas
2005 2030 2005 2005 2005
EU-27
Czechia
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
52.3
27.4
62.9
18.0
64.6
64.2
50.3
63.9
44.7
69.6
39.6
-17.4
43.4
-22.6
88.5
82.2
97.4
79.2
96.0
81.9
57.7
97.8
81.1
69.7
97.2
Remark: Negative numbers indicate that the country is a net exporter.
Source: EU Energy in Figures, Pocket Book 2007 (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy), 
Mantzos, L.–Capros, P. 2006.
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the eastern half of Europe (enlargement of the EU, establishment of pro-Western 
and pro-Russian economic organizations4 in the former Soviet space) heavily 
transformed the economic equilibrum of international energy (export-import) 
systems and increased the importance of their geopolitic aspects. During the 
second half of 1990s started the eﬀ orts at diversifi cation of energy supply routes 
and bypassing of transit states with new pipeline construction projects.
The dominant actors of the recent west Eurasian geopolitical games 
on energetics, of the new pipeline projects are the Russian Federation and 
the EU (and the USA). The EU-27 largely depends on Russian gas and oil im-
ports (45.1% and 29.9% in 2005), so does Russia depend on European markets 
(Table 4.). The European oil and gas exports represent about 2/3 of total Russian 
exports (Esnault, B. et al. 2007). Accordingly the main economic goal of Russia 
to remain reliable energy supplier for Europe, to decrease dependence from the 
traditional transit countries (fi rst of all from Ukraine and Belarus) and to pre-
serve its dominant position on EU’s gas and oil markets. The latt er is connected 
with the reviving political ambitions of the Kremlin to use energy supply as 
geopolitical weapon to restore past international political position of Russia.
Pipeline projects to reduce Russian dependence
Since second half of 1990s USA pushed for construction of several pipelines 
(e.g. TCGP: Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline, 1996- or Trans Caspian oil pipe-
⁴ GUAM (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, 1997) established 
by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaĳ an and Moldova to counterbalance Russian infl uence. A 
common interest in eﬀ orts to resolve “frozen confl icts” in their territory (Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaĳ an, Transnistria in Moldova) also 
unite these GUAM countries located in the buﬀ er zone between Russia, the EU and NATO 
and blaming problems for the presence of Russian military forces. EURASEC (Eurasian 
Economic Community) proclaimed on October 10, 2000 by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan (and with the accession of Uzbekistan in 2006) was the union of customs and 
tariﬀ s within CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). 
Table 4. Origin of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Import of EU-27 (2005, in %)
Crude Oil Natural Gas
Russian Federation
Africa
Norway
Middle East
Caspian
Other regions
Total
29.9
18.1
15.5
20.1
6.8
9.6
100.0
45.1
28.3
24.1
2.5
0.0
0.0
100.0
Source: htt p://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy
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line) that would carry Caspian energy westward without transiting Russia. It 
would break Russia’s monopoly on the region’s energy transportation system. 
Moscow moved fast to construct its own Blue Stream submarine gas pipeline 
(2001–2005) from Russia to Turkey, which killed the USA and EU backed TCGP 
project (Geropoulos, K. 2007). At the same time with strong USA support the 
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) project (between Baku and Erzerum) was re-
alised (2006), which allowed Azerbaĳ an and Georgia to resist Russian political 
and economic pressure (Table 5). This gas pipeline with the potential of being 
connected to the Turkmen and Kazakh producers via the planned TCGP would 
be in the future the supplier of the EU backed Nabucco and TGI pipelines. On 
the SCP and the Baku–Supsa, Tbilisi–Yerevan–Tabriz gas pipelines based the 
Ukrainian project of Supsa–Feodosiia submarine pipeline between Georgia 
and Ukraine (bypassing Russia), which could supply Caspian and Iranian gas 
to Ukraine and other European countries. 
The Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) was built during the 
period 2002 and 2006, between the Azerbaĳ ani capital Baku and the Turkish 
Mediterranean port, Ceyhan and represents the second longest oil pipeline of 
the world (1,768 km). The establishment of the pipeline route was geopoliti-
cally and ecologically motivated (bypassing Russia, Iran, the unstable Middle 
East and the overcrowded Turkish straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles) and 
served the increase of the economic independence of the GUAM-member 
Azerbaĳ an from Russia.
For December 2002 a new plan has been worked out regarding the 
extension of the Ukrainian Odesa–Brody oil pipeline (built 2001) to the Polish 
port of Gdańsk. This would be the only route for transporting Caspian oil to 
Central Europe, to the Visegrád countries – bypassing Russia, via the GUAM 
states: Azerbaĳ an, Georgia, Ukraine (through Baku–Batumi–Odesa/Pivdennyi 
terminals). Although it is supported by the EU, this pipeline has only 9 million 
tons annual capacity, which is very modest comparing to larger projects in 
terms of commercial att ractiveness. Moreover, Russia has successfully blocked 
oil transport from Kazakhstan to Ukrainian seaport Odesa. Kazakhstan de-
clined to join this project, unless it is transformed to include Russia and com-
mitt ed additional massive oil volumes for export via Russia. On 10 October 
2007 an agreement to form this pipeline consortium was signed by Poland, 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaĳ an in Vilnius. Finally, in accodance 
with Russia’s will the Kazakh oil (from the giant Tengiz fi led) started to sup-
ply the Odeas-Brody pipeline via the CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) in 
Russia. This project is highly important to make safe oil supply for East Central 
Europe, fi rst of all for Poland and Lithuania. 
On April 3, 2007 Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Italy signed an 
agreement about the construction of a 1,400 km long oil pipeline (South East 
European Line, SEEL) from the Romanian port Constanţa to the Italian Trieste. 
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This EU backed pipe with a planned capacity up to 90 million tons annually 
would reduce tanker transportation in the Turkish straits and Adriatic Sea 
and would be a competitor to the Russian dominated Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
pipeline transporting oil from the Black Sea, Caspian area to the largest mar-
kets of the EU. Most likely source of the oil could be the large Kazakh fi elds, 
from where the main transit routes (CPC) are under Russian control (Socor, 
V. 2006).
Since the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2005), the changed, pro-
Western (EU and NATO) att itudes of Ukrainian foreign policy resulted the in-
crease of Russian natural gas and crude oil prices up to the international level. 
In January 2006 a real gas confl ict was burst out between the two countries be-
cause following the unsuccessful talks about gas prices the Ukrainian Naft ohaz 
company siphoned the main transit gas pipelines running via Ukraine from 
Russia to Central and Western Europe, which resulted the Russian shutdown 
of gas supply. This was not a unique phenomenon, Russia oft en shut down 
pipelines supplies during the time of political disputes (e.g. 2003 Latvia; 2006 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, 2007 Azerbaĳ an), which enabled by the extremely 
close relationship between the Russian energy industry and the Kremlin.
Following the gas crisis the EU expressly endeavours to decrease stra-
tegic dependence (EU-25 43% in 2005) on Russian (Gazprom’s) gas and to 
diversify energy supply (Hafner, M. 2006). The fi rst step of this was to real-
ize alternative, non-Russian controlled gas corridors to EU: the Nabucco and 
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI), for further diversifi cation of export possibilities to 
the European markets, with bypassing Russia and Ukraine. Construction of 
the 3,300 km long Nabucco gas pipeline is expected to begin in 2009 and is 
planned to be fi nished in 2012. It would connect Baumgarten an der March, the 
largest natural gas hub in Austria with Erzerum in Turkey, the end of South 
Caucasus Pipeline. Once completed, it would allow transportation of natural 
gas from producers in the Caspian region such as Azerbaĳ an, Turkmenistan 
and Iran to EU and to the countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary) 
along its path. The recently announced TGI pipe would transfer Caspian gas 
from Turkey through Greece to Italy with an annual capacity of 11.5 bcm and 
completition date of 2012. Though it was an original Austrian conception to 
carry Iranian gas to Europe, the Nabucco project was delayed for years by USA 
opposition to development of Iran’s gas fi elds. Western failure to engage with 
Turkmenistan deprived Nabucco of that possible source of gas for Europe. 
Washington had to insist that Azerbaĳ ani gas alone (expected to fl ow in com-
ing years to eastern Turkey) could support both Nabucco and the planned TGI 
pipeline simultaneously, an argument that led to more questions. Turkey’s 
government, driven by short-term tactical and political considerations (oft en 
unrelated to energy policy as such), never came fully on board the Nabucco 
project. As a result of existing and planned „pro-Russian” and „pro-Western” 
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energetic corridors Turkey became a natural hub for Caspian and Iranian 
gas destined for Europe and the arena of rivalry between EU/US and Russia. 
This strategic transit country similarly to Ukraine is increasingly depends on 
Russian energetic  supplies (60% of natural gas and 20% of oil imports). Due to 
the Russian infl uence, Turkey has already demonstrated cool att itude towards 
Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO aspiration and openly opposed NATO’s naval 
deployments in Black Sea area (Tsereteli, M. 2005).
Pipeline projects to secure Russia’s market positions
Between 1994–1999 was built the 4,196 km long Yamal-Europe pipeline (since 
2005 with a capacity of 33 bcm) to supply Russian gas from the Yamal penin-
sula the North Central European market via Belarus, Poland and Germany. 
The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) transports Russian oil from the Timan 
– Pechora area, West Siberia and the Volga-Ural region to the oil terminal 
Primorsk at the Golf of Finland. The pipe built between 1997–2001 aims to 
bypass the continental transit countries (e.g. Belarus, Ukraine, V4) and supply 
the Western Europe by tankers via the Baltic Sea.
With similar Russian geopolitical motivations was planned (from 1997) 
and started to construct (from 2005) the Nord Stream (former names: North 
Transgas, North European Gas Pipeline) with a 1,196 km long Baltic Sea oﬀ -
shore section between the Russian Vyborg and the German Greifswald. The 
Nord Stream submarine pipeline as an alternative route of the Russian gas 
to West-Central Europe beside of the existing Yamal-Europe pipe have seen 
by opponents as geopolitical weapon against the continental energy transit 
countries (Belarus, Ukraine and V4). The Nord Stream seems to be a tool to 
exert Russian political infl uence on transit countries by threatening their gas 
supply without aﬀ ecting gas exports to Western Europe (Baran, Z. 2007). 
The disagreement over oil tariﬀ s between Belarus and Russia at the 
beginning of January 2007 led to a disruption of oil supplies via Druzhba pipe-
line to Central Europe between January 8 and 11, 2007. Following this event 
the Russian government decided to construct an oil pipeline (Baltic Pipeline 
System-2, BPS-2) from the Druzhba pipe (from Unecha near the Belarus bor-
der) to the Baltic Sea port Primorsk, which annual throughout capacity is 
expected to increase up to 150 million tons.  The BPS-2 reducing Russia’s reli-
ance from the transit state Belarus will redirect about half of the capacity of the 
Druzhba, the oldest and largest oil pipeline transporting Russian and Kazakh 
oil across Europe. This project will cause Belarus a possible loss of revenue of 
3–400 million Euro annually (Resnicoff, M. 2007). 
The Northern Early Oil (NEO) pipeline transports oil from the large 
Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) fi elds in the Caspian Sea near Baku via Grozny 
61
to the Russian port Novorossiysk since 1997 and folowing a break since 2005. 
With the launch of the EU-US backed BTC oil pipeline in 2005–2006 the utiliza-
tion of NEO’s capacity is reduced considerably (Zaslavsky, I. 2006).
It was a strategic mistake for the West and a big success for Russia, 
that the 1,510 km long Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) oil pipeline, 
planned to export annually 65 million tons of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia 
(Tengiz – Novorossiysk), was built also by American companies (e.g. Chevron) 
with government approval from the late 1990s to 2001. Currently operating at 
some 28.2 million tons of oil annually, this Russian controlled pipeline direct 
the majority of Kazakhstan’s growing oil output and export to Russia, which 
fact ruined the Western-backed Trans Caspian oil pipeline project (Aqtau 
– Baku) and seriously damage the interests of the US government-backed 
BTC pipeline. 
On May 25, 2007 Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signed a basic treaty to 
implement of the project Burgas – Alexandroupolis oil (previous name: Trans-
Balkan Oil, TBO) pipeline during the period of 2008–2011. This 279 km long 
pipe is the fi rst on the territory of EU to be 51% owned by Russian fi rms and 
aims to supply the western markets with Russian-Kazakh oil bypassing the 
overcrowded Turkish straits.
The Russian geopolitical goals of the construction of the 1,213 km long 
trans-Black Sea gas pipeline, Blue Stream (2005) was to block the plans (TCGP 
and Nabucco) of the EU to use the territory of Turkey to bring gas from the 
Caspian and the Middle East to Europe bypassing Russia. The absence of a real 
Western energy strategy in Western-Central Asian region was demonstrated by 
the ENI, Italy’s state-controlled energy holding company, which was partner of 
the Russian Gazprom at the building of the Blue Stream, loaning the technol-
ogy and fi nancing for the submarine pipeline (Socor, V. 2007). 
Russia evidently again trying to preempt Nabucco and TGI pipeleines 
to preserve its European market dominance. Following the Western opposi-
tion to Gazprom’s involvement in Nabucco, Russia announced in June 2007 
the Russian-Italian project South Stream (900 km long submarine pipeline 
from Russian Novorossiysk to Bulgarian Varna) bypassing both the Caucasian 
countries and Ukraine. From Varna the southwestern route of the South Stream 
would run through Greece to South Italy, the northwestern route would con-
tinue via Romania, Hungary and Slovenia to North Italy.
Beside of this Russia in the frame of its anti-Nabucco campaign in May-
June 2007 signed agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
(with the main gas supplier of the planned Nabucco) to construct new Russia-
bound gas export pipelines, which seriously damage the EU-plans about non-
Russian controlled pipelines from the Caspian region. According to these 
plans vital for the Gazprom and Russia among others a gas pipeline would 
establish from the Russian Aleksandrov Gai (crossing of Soyuz and Central 
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Asia Center Pipelines) to Ukrainian Novopskov, in the same corridor, which is 
used for the Soyuz (1983) gas pipeline. With an annual 28 bcm capacity, this gas 
pipeline could serve as a link in the system through which gas is transported 
from Central Asia to Europe. The pipeline expansion between Uzhhorod and 
Novopskov would strengthen the role of Ukraine as transit country for natural 
gas to Central and Western Europe.
Due to these agreements Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
almost completely depended on Russian-controlled export pipelines. This 
situation made possible for the Russian Gazprom to purchase gas at a rate 
of about 45–65 USD/1,000 cubic metres (Dec., 2006) from these Central Asian 
countries and sell that gas to Western Europe for around 230 USD (Baran, Z. 
2007). To keep out Turkmenistan from the West (and to retain as a reliable gas 
supplier) Gazprom agreed to rise the price of Turkmen gas from 100 USD/1,000 
cubic metres in December 2007 to 130–150 USD in 2008, which could result 
the increase in gas prices also in Ukraine and in V4.
In 2007 Russia’s strategy for Caspian energy resources and transport 
routes was almost completely successful. The main goals of this strategy 
were the following: encircling the EU by gas pipelines (Nord Stream, South 
Stream) bypassing problematic transit countries; buying the majority of the 
East Caspian gas as cheap as possibly and selling as expensively as possible; 
bringing Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas to the West through Russian controlled 
pipes; making Russia’s ties with the Caspian as strong as possible; discourag-
ing or killing competing EU/US backed projects (e.g. TCGP, Nabucco, TGI) and 
ensuring the West that Russia is reliable energy supplier (Karbuz, S. 2007).
Recent developments
The Nabucco Project
For the spring of 2009 new challenges has been emerged for supporters of 
Nabucco projects to cope with. According to original plans the pipeline is 
scheduled to start operating in 2013, but it is doubtful that it will be built. 
Continued and current hesitation by the private sector to fi nance this project, 
not to mention the brief war between Russia and Georgia for South Ossetia in 
August 2008, means that Nabucco has to face an uncertain future.
It’s also a real problem, that Nabucco faces many further obstacles, 
among which are the planned rival South Stream pipeline, supported by 
Russia's giant company Gazprom. The European Commission insists that 
Nabucco is not an att empt to fi nd alternatives to Russian supplies, but a neces-
sary additional channel. This position is confi rmed heavily by ÖMV Austrian 
gas and oil company, interested in the project.
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The gas crisis burst out between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 
and cut or disrupted gas supplies to 18 EU member countries did not appear 
to be a suﬃ  cient argument in favour of Nabucco among experts of European 
Parliament's foreign aﬀ airs committ ee. At political level, at fi rst it had ap-
peared that Nabucco would gain credibility in light of the crisis.
In mid January 2009 the member states of the European Parliament 
have issued a rather pessimistic draft  report on EU energy security, in which 
Nabucco featured prominently. This important report was presented just a 
few days before Hungary organizes a 'Nabucco summit' in Budapest at the 
end of that month. 
The summit had raised hopes that the project could be re-launched 
soonest. Representatives of the Czech Republic, which country holds a half 
year rotating EU presidency, have indicated they will push for Nabucco project 
as one of its top priorities.
Idependent experts of the Centre for European Policy Studies empha-
size that the main question is: Where the Nabucco-gas come from? Lack of 
large technical investment makes imports from Iran problematic. It is because 
that country is still a net importer of gas, despite holding the world's second-
largest natural gas reserves. Besides, serious political and economic sanctions 
against Iran make the whole Nabucco project appear more likely to be realised 
only in the distant future. 
As for Turkmenistan the country's government is reluctant to deliver 
gas to Europe, as it prefers to sell to Russia on high prices and Turmenistan 
also has China as an alternative client. 
Regarding the issue of transit Turkey can be considered as a key transit 
country. It has huge domestic demand for Russian or othe natural gas itself, 
while legal disputes on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea could be used by 
Russia to block the project. Additional problem is the fi nancing of Nabucco 
which remained a challenge. 
Problems regarding to the Nabucco project has emerged in the focus of 
more NATO experts. They also express their scepticism towards the project. By 
their latest opinion it remains unclear which sources and routes would be more 
benefi cial and reliable. The warned, if the main goal of the European Union is 
to enhance routes that are not controlled by Moscow, there is a real risk that 
the EU will compete in markets in which it is not familiar or well-placed. 
The South and North Stream projects
The plan to build the South Stream, a new gas pipeline under the Black Sea 
linking the Russian Black Sea port Novorossiysk to Bulgaria's Varna would 
mean that Russia would no longer send its gas supplies through Ukraine, 
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which locked horns with Russia over payment of outstanding gas debts last 
December. The dispute led to gas supply disruptions to European consumers 
in winter. It will contribute the diversifi cation of gas supplies, which is an 
important factor in energy security. 
Putt ing into operation South Stream will meet these requirements. 
Gazprom’s representatives more times promised to develop of the Arctic gas 
fi eld, which has estimated reserves of 133 trillion cubic feet. That would sup-
ply the North Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, currently being 
built under the Baltic Sea.
Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy and many other EU-members have 
also reiterated their interest in construction of the South Stream gas pipeline, 
intended to send Russian gas to Europe across the Black Sea bed. The South 
Stream gas pipeline, is due to be commissioned in 2013.
Meanwhile Belarus has proposed another pipeline to guarantee a sta-
ble supply of Russian natural gas to Europe, and has sought involvement of 
Poland and Germany in the project. The proposed pipeline would bring gas 
from the Yamal Peninsula in NW Siberia. But some Ukrainian experts are cau-
tioning against such expansion. The emphasize, it is necessary to guarantee not 
just the route but the supplier. Presently, several European countries depend 
solely on the Russian monopoly Gazprom, and construction of more pipelines 
from Russia would only reinforce dependency on Russian gas.
Additionally, the major part of the North Stream pipeline is designed 
to be laid almost entirely along the sea bott om that runs through the economic 
zones of Baltic countries. This plan creates additional tension over national se-
curity concerns, land ownership and environmental issues. A purely economic 
issue here is ownership of the gas and the transmission pipelines. 
Ukraininan economists suggest separating the object of gas transporta-
tion and the pipelines to avoid vertical integration and monopolization of the 
market. It would be necessary because both ‘Stream’ projects are not reliable 
means to diversify gas transit through Ukraine and to ensure constant gas 
supplies to East and West European countries as consumers.
Finally, Hungary has made a contract with Russia in March 2009 to 
contribute to the construction costs of Hungarian section of South Stream (in 
a rate of 15%) which oﬀ ers an alternative solution in gas supply instead of the 
traditional route running via Ukraine. 
Further alternative solution to Hungary for a safe gas supply
Hungary is one of the most energy-sensitive country among East Central 
European states. It was suﬀ ering from the negative eﬀ ects of gas crisis during 
January 2009 and now is searching for alternative solutions to safe enough 
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quantity of natural gas for their consumers inside of the country. It seems to 
be a strategic question because of the high rate of natural gas consumption 
for electric energy production. Between 1990 and 2007 it’s share has increased 
from 19.7% to 37,9% in Hungary (Reményi, 2009).
Desiring to perevent the crisis situation in the future Hungary and 
Croatia plan to build a brand new gas transit pipeline by mid-2011 which 
would ship gas from Hungary to Croatia, but would also allow two-way ship-
ments later. This plan has been announced by the representatives of MOL's gas 
transmission ‘Földgázszállító’ (FGSZ = Natural Gas Transporter), the leading 
gas supplier in Hungary in February 2009.
The new pipeline would have an annual capacity of around 6.5 bil-
lion cbms. The heads of Plinacro, the gas branch of Croatian INA, and the 
Hungarian company FGSZ” decided to sign a joint development agreement 
soon aimed at connecting the pipeline networks of Hungary and Croatia.
The new pipeline will be reversible, which means once a planned liquefi ed 
natural gas (LNG) terminal which is built on the island of Krk in Croatia’s north-
ern Adriatic. This also means that this small independent country in SE-Europe 
will be able to connect to any of the major international pipelines that may be 
built in the future, like Nabucco or South Stream. By the content of the cintract 
Földgázszállító will build the 206-km long Hungarian section of the pipeline, 
while Croatia will cover the costs of the 88 km stretch in Croatia. The pipeline will 
connect the village of Városföld in Hungary with Slobodnica in Croatia.
The Balkans were severely aﬀ ected by stopping in gas supplies arising 
from Moscow’s dispute with Ukraine this January and Croatia considered the 
planned LNG terminal as crucial for diversifying energy supplies.
Hungary, which also heavily relies on Russian gas imports but has suf-
fi cient reserves and has also domestic natural gas production on the territory of 
Hungarian Alföld (Great Plain) shipped gas to Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia during 
the gas crisis in January. The large capacity LNG terminal planned by a consor-
tium of Croatian and European energy fi rms, should also improve supply security 
for the wider region as it will be able to process more gas than Croatia needs. 
Conclusions
The global increase of hydrocarbon energy demand resulted the sustained in-
crease in energy prices since 1999 and pushed the energy (especially the gas 
supply) security as a dominant global geopolitical issue. There is an energy 
interdependency between the suppliers and consumers, which underline the 
need of security of supply and of markets. Although the fair relations between 
the exporters, importers and the transit countries should be the priority of en-
ergy issues, due to the increasing competition for energy resources and markets, 
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beside of economic factors also the geopolitical motivations could be observed 
at decision making. As a result of litt le unity among EU-member states’ energy 
policies Russia oft en took advantage of this situation. Due to this lack of unity 
the Kremlin could “preemptively block European att empts to construct trans-
port routes for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas that do not involve Rus-
sia” (Baran, Z. 2007). The countries, and the large European energy companies 
(e.g. ENI, BASF, Ruhrgas, Gaz de France, Gasunie) are played against each other 
by Moscow in order to secure more favourable (oft en dominant) market situa-
tion for Russia. Sometimes Russia seems to strive aft er driving wedge between 
the eastern (former Soviet ally) and western member states of the EU.
The energy strategy of East Central European countries have joined to 
EU in 2004, it can be stated that majority of these countries have already energy 
policy and strategy to secure their own energy supply. All of them are making 
fl uent eﬀ orts to be independent from considerable part of the Russian oil and 
gas import in the near or farer future. To avoid negative eﬀ ects of the future’s 
unforeseen gas wars and unfriendly actions originated from Russia or Ukraine, 
the new member states of the European Union have worked out more scenarios 
and projects for the future. Additionally, they have also declared targets to 
increase the rate of renewable energy in their domestic energy production.
Opposite to it Hungary is still stuck into powerful energy econo-
mies that drive to international energy-security politics. The county has just 
switched sides when turned oﬀ  from US initiations and gave preference to 
Russian connections. Furthermore there are no visible indication of a coherent 
national energy security strategy. It is not surprising that the country is not 
taken into account when decisions are made, neither to the extent is should. It 
shoud be priority to take pending political decisions and  form a real national 
strategy.
Hungary’s EU lobbying techniques should also be enhanced. However, 
without clear political intentions and decisions it is diﬃ  cult to lobby for any-
thing. Technically and fi nancially the country is not prepared to provide a sub-
stantial portion of national energy production from renewable energy sources. 
It is very unlikely that long term objectives will be integrated into eﬀ ective 
government actions. The European Union is also putt ing the requirement of 
sound economic management over savings energy and all these initiatives 
Hungary have to take into consideration. 
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